Reference 2.2


Fouillee Commentary

1. ἆρον…πάντων τῶν, retire ton aversion de tout ce qui..., c'est à dire cesse de donner pour objet a ton aversion rien de ce qui...

2. ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος, quant à présent. Plus tard, quand tu auras fait des progrès dans la sagesse, tu désireras ce qui est bonnète.

3. σοι πάρεστι, est à ta portée.

4. μόνῳ, parce que ὁρμᾶν et ἀφορμᾶν signifient des mouvements de l'amé d'un ordre moins élevé que le désir et l'aversion. Voyez le Lexique.

5. μεθ᾽ ὑπεξαιρέσεως, en faisant des réserves, c'est à dire en prévoyant qu'on n'aura pas ce qu'on recherche, ou qu'on tombera dans ce qu'on veut éviter.

Thurot Commentary

1.Sous condition «μεθ᾽ ὑπεξαιρέσεως», c’est-à-dire en exceptant de sa volonté les accidents qui peuvent survenir. Les Stoïciens prétendaient que le sage ne doit s’étonner de rien et n'être déçu par aucun événement. Pour qu'il soit libre, il faut que tout ce qui arrive soit accepté et voulu par lui.—Mais si quel- que chose arrive contre son attente et son intention, ne sera-t-il pas déçu? —Pour éviter cette déception, les Stoïciens conseillent de vouloir d’avance les exceptions possibles, et de consentir d’avance au contraire de ce que nous avions voulu. Je veux arriver au port; mais, si je fais naufrage, je consens d’avance à faire naufrage : de cette manière les exceptions elles-mêmes confirmeront la règle.

Greek

ἆρον οὖν τὴν ἔκκλισιν ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ μετάθες ἐπὶ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. τὴν ὄρεξιν δὲ παντελῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἄνελε· ἄν τε γὰρ ὀρέγῃ τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τινος, ἀτυχεῖν ἀνάγκη τῶν τε ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὅσων ὀρέγεσθαι καλὸν ἄν, οὐδὲν οὐδέπω σοι πάρεστι. μόνῳ δὲ τῷ ὁρμᾶν καὶ ἀφορμᾶν χρῶ, κούφως μέντοι καὶ μεθ' ὑπεξαιρέσεως καὶ ἀνειμένως.

English

Remove [the habit of] aversion, then, from all things that are not within our power, and apply it to things undesirable, which are within our power. But for the present altogether restrain desire; for if you desire any of the things not within our own power, you must necessarily be disappointed; and you are not yet secure of those which are within our power, and so are legitimate objects of desire. Where it is practically necessary for you to pursue or avoid anything, do even this with discretion, and gentleness, and moderation.

DCC Notes

ἆρον: > αἴρω, 2 sg. aor. act. imper., “remove”; first aorist with the sigma dropping out after the liquid (G. 328; S. 544c).

ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος: “for the present,” “for the time being” (LSJ πάρειμι [εἰμί sum] II)

ἄνελε: > ἀναιρέω, 2 sg. aor. act. imper., “remove,” “put off,” “suspend.” Since desiring what is right is the most important element of Stoic ethics, Epictetus here advises that students put off or suspend desire until they have established a firm understanding and foundation of what is good. Cf. Diss. 3.12.8, where Epictetus maintains that the one in training (ἀσκητής) not employ his desire, and use his aversion toward things which are in his volition, i.e., under his control. Cf. also Diss. 1.4.1. Apparently, it is easier for students to know what to avoid.

ὀρέγῃ: > ὀρέγω, 2 sg. pres. mid. subj. in a conditional + imperative construction. Here ἀτυχεῖν ἀνάγκη is equivalent to the imperative.

τῶν τε ἐφ᾿ἡμῖν ... πάρεστι: a clearer word order would be: οὐδὲν τῶν τε ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὅσων ὀρέγεσθαι καλὸν ἄν (sc. εἴη), οὐδέπω σοι πάρεστι, “none of the things that are up to us, and which it would be proper to desire, is yet within your reach” (Smith 2014). πάρεστι: see LSJ πάρειμι [εἰμί sum] II. The infinitive ὀρέγεσθαι explains the adjective καλόν (S. 2001 and 2002).

τῷ ὁρμᾶν καὶ ἀφορμᾶν: “use only positive and negative impulses.” The articular infinitives are objects of χρῶ (> χράομαι, 2 sg. pres. mid. imper.), which takes a dative. Since the true Stoic “desire”—goodness of character—is not yet within the grasp of beginning students, they must for now rely on “impulses” regarding what it is reasonable to aim at in the external sphere, where the outcome is not “up to us.” (Smith 2014)

μεθ' ὑπεξαιρέσεως: “with reservation.” One should perform appropriate action (the object of impulse) with the knowledge that it may not be fulfilled. For example, one may love one’s spouse or child and act in such a way to ensure a long and healthy life for them, all while knowing that they are mortal and thus subject to death and disease. See the next chapter for more on this.

DCC Vocab

μετατίθημι, μεταθήσω, μετέθηκα, to transfer

παντελῶς, (adv.) absolutely, completely

ἀτυχέω, ἀτυχήσω, ἠτύχησα, to be unfortunate

οὐδέπω, not yet

ἀφορμάω, ἀφορμήσω, ἀφόρμησα, to have a negative impulse, feel aversion, opp. ὁρμάω

κούφως, (adv.) lightly, nimbly

ὑπεξαίρεσις, -εως, ἡ, a reservation

ἀνειμένως, (adv.) without straining

Schenkl Cross-references

cf. I, 4, 1; Ench. 48, 3; fragm. XXVII; III, 12, 7; III, 22, 13 (IV, 4, 33); IV, 4, 35; cf. IV, 1, 84; cf. fragm. XXVII

Boter Cross-references

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Fouillee Commentary

1. ἆρον…πάντων τῶν, retire ton aversion de tout ce qui..., c'est à dire cesse de donner pour objet a ton aversion rien de ce qui...

2. ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος, quant à présent. Plus tard, quand tu auras fait des progrès dans la sagesse, tu désireras ce qui est bonnète.

3. σοι πάρεστι, est à ta portée.

4. μόνῳ, parce que ὁρμᾶν et ἀφορμᾶν signifient des mouvements de l'amé d'un ordre moins élevé que le désir et l'aversion. Voyez le Lexique.

5. μεθ᾽ ὑπεξαιρέσεως, en faisant des réserves, c'est à dire en prévoyant qu'on n'aura pas ce qu'on recherche, ou qu'on tombera dans ce qu'on veut éviter.

Thurot Commentary

1.Sous condition «μεθ᾽ ὑπεξαιρέσεως», c’est-à-dire en exceptant de sa volonté les accidents qui peuvent survenir. Les Stoïciens prétendaient que le sage ne doit s’étonner de rien et n'être déçu par aucun événement. Pour qu'il soit libre, il faut que tout ce qui arrive soit accepté et voulu par lui.—Mais si quel- que chose arrive contre son attente et son intention, ne sera-t-il pas déçu? —Pour éviter cette déception, les Stoïciens conseillent de vouloir d’avance les exceptions possibles, et de consentir d’avance au contraire de ce que nous avions voulu. Je veux arriver au port; mais, si je fais naufrage, je consens d’avance à faire naufrage : de cette manière les exceptions elles-mêmes confirmeront la règle.

Greek

ἆρον οὖν τὴν ἔκκλισιν ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ μετάθες ἐπὶ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. τὴν ὄρεξιν δὲ παντελῶς ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἄνελε· ἄν τε γὰρ ὀρέγῃ τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τινος, ἀτυχεῖν ἀνάγκη τῶν τε ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὅσων ὀρέγεσθαι καλὸν ἄν, οὐδὲν οὐδέπω σοι πάρεστι. μόνῳ δὲ τῷ ὁρμᾶν καὶ ἀφορμᾶν χρῶ, κούφως μέντοι καὶ μεθ' ὑπεξαιρέσεως καὶ ἀνειμένως.

English

Remove [the habit of] aversion, then, from all things that are not within our power, and apply it to things undesirable, which are within our power. But for the present altogether restrain desire; for if you desire any of the things not within our own power, you must necessarily be disappointed; and you are not yet secure of those which are within our power, and so are legitimate objects of desire. Where it is practically necessary for you to pursue or avoid anything, do even this with discretion, and gentleness, and moderation.

DCC Notes

ἆρον: > αἴρω, 2 sg. aor. act. imper., “remove”; first aorist with the sigma dropping out after the liquid (G. 328; S. 544c).

ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος: “for the present,” “for the time being” (LSJ πάρειμι [εἰμί sum] II)

ἄνελε: > ἀναιρέω, 2 sg. aor. act. imper., “remove,” “put off,” “suspend.” Since desiring what is right is the most important element of Stoic ethics, Epictetus here advises that students put off or suspend desire until they have established a firm understanding and foundation of what is good. Cf. Diss. 3.12.8, where Epictetus maintains that the one in training (ἀσκητής) not employ his desire, and use his aversion toward things which are in his volition, i.e., under his control. Cf. also Diss. 1.4.1. Apparently, it is easier for students to know what to avoid.

ὀρέγῃ: > ὀρέγω, 2 sg. pres. mid. subj. in a conditional + imperative construction. Here ἀτυχεῖν ἀνάγκη is equivalent to the imperative.

τῶν τε ἐφ᾿ἡμῖν ... πάρεστι: a clearer word order would be: οὐδὲν τῶν τε ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὅσων ὀρέγεσθαι καλὸν ἄν (sc. εἴη), οὐδέπω σοι πάρεστι, “none of the things that are up to us, and which it would be proper to desire, is yet within your reach” (Smith 2014). πάρεστι: see LSJ πάρειμι [εἰμί sum] II. The infinitive ὀρέγεσθαι explains the adjective καλόν (S. 2001 and 2002).

τῷ ὁρμᾶν καὶ ἀφορμᾶν: “use only positive and negative impulses.” The articular infinitives are objects of χρῶ (> χράομαι, 2 sg. pres. mid. imper.), which takes a dative. Since the true Stoic “desire”—goodness of character—is not yet within the grasp of beginning students, they must for now rely on “impulses” regarding what it is reasonable to aim at in the external sphere, where the outcome is not “up to us.” (Smith 2014)

μεθ' ὑπεξαιρέσεως: “with reservation.” One should perform appropriate action (the object of impulse) with the knowledge that it may not be fulfilled. For example, one may love one’s spouse or child and act in such a way to ensure a long and healthy life for them, all while knowing that they are mortal and thus subject to death and disease. See the next chapter for more on this.

DCC Vocab

μετατίθημι, μεταθήσω, μετέθηκα, to transfer

παντελῶς, (adv.) absolutely, completely

ἀτυχέω, ἀτυχήσω, ἠτύχησα, to be unfortunate

οὐδέπω, not yet

ἀφορμάω, ἀφορμήσω, ἀφόρμησα, to have a negative impulse, feel aversion, opp. ὁρμάω

κούφως, (adv.) lightly, nimbly

ὑπεξαίρεσις, -εως, ἡ, a reservation

ἀνειμένως, (adv.) without straining

Schenkl Cross-references

cf. I, 4, 1; Ench. 48, 3; fragm. XXVII; III, 12, 7; III, 22, 13 (IV, 4, 33); IV, 4, 35; cf. IV, 1, 84; cf. fragm. XXVII

Boter Cross-references

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